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Abstract: One of the most popular explanations for post-9/11 anti-Americanism argues that resentment
against America and Americans is mainly a function of the US government’s unpopular actions. The
present article challenges this interpretation: first, it argues that neither the vitality of the resentment
in times when the United States had no influence in the respective parts of the world nor its recent
radical manifestations are accounted for in a political reductionist framework. In fact, specific traditions
of anti-Americanism have an influence on the negative attitudes observed today, as a comparison
between Britain, France, Germany, and Poland reveals. Second, this article suggests an alternative
theoretical approach. Anti-Americanism can be explained by two basic mechanisms: it functions as
a strategy to project denied and disliked self-concepts onto an external object, and it offers an
interpretation frame for complex social processes that allows to reduce cognitive dissonance.
Multivariate analyses based on empirical data collected in the Pew surveys of 2002 and 2007 show
the fruitfulness of our theoretical approach.
INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, aversion to the United States has
gained such popularity that some commentators suspect
we are facing the beginning of an ‘anti-American
century’ (Krastev, 2004). If this is the case, the attacks
of 9/11, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, and the
transatlantic diplomatic tensions of the past decade
mark the beginning of a continuing escalation between
the United States and a heterogeneous group including
radical terror networks and anti-American publics or
governments in different parts of the world.
Although anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon
to scholars of European societies (Markovits, 1985;
Spiro, 1988; Hollander, 1992), its development since
the breakdown of the communist bloc has been a
relevant one. As most political scientists suggest, the
United States became the sole global superpower by the
past decade of the 20th century (Bacevich, 2002). And
although its economic and even military capabilities
seem to have been stretched to their limit, its soft power
(Nye, 2004) remains strong.
Against this background one intuitive answer to the
question why the United States is so strongly disliked in
some parts of the world today refers to its hegemonic
role in world politics and economics. Building on this
assumption, some scholars argue that anti-Americanism
is a response to actions performed by the United States
(Cunliffe, 1986; Fabbrini, 2004; Nolan, 2005; Kohut and
Stokes, 2006; Friedman, 2008; Holsti, 2008). Such an
approach, however, seems unsatisfactory for two reasons:
although anti-Americanism today is not completely
detached from US policies and their consequences, a
strictly pragmatic approach can neither explain the
vitality of the resentment in times when the United
States had virtually no influence in the respective parts of
the world (which is to say: the greater part of its history)
nor can it account for its radical manifestations.
The aim of this article is thus to transcend a mere
political concept of anti-Americanism. To explicate our
argument that the latter is unable to deal with the
phenomenon adequately, we commence with a short
conceptual clarification. We subsequently offer a histor-
ical overview that discloses the irrational ‘surplus’
(Berman, 2008) of today’s aversion against ‘America’
because it shows that anti-Americanism existed long
before the United States had any global influence. If we
compare the specific traditions of the resentment in
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Britain, France, Germany, and Poland with the recent
trends for the years 2002–2010, we find that the
chronicles of anti-Americanism have an influence on
the recent perception of the United States and of
Americans: Germany and France, compared with
Britain and especially Poland, have a stronger history
of anti-Americanism and also show stronger negative
opinions on Americans and the United States today.
In the second half of the article, we outline explana-
tory mechanisms, derive hypotheses, and test them with
multivariate analyses. The theoretical approach is based
on an interpretation of the phenomenon that assumes
that anti-American attitudes are based on individual
perceptions of domestic developments rather than on the
bilateral relations as such (Hollander, 1992; Diner, 1996;
Roger, 2005; Markovits, 2007a; Berman, 2008). We add
to this research by sketching out two mechanisms
underlying anti-American attitudes. First, we assume
that anti-Americanism is constituted by a projection of
denied and disliked self-concepts. Negative aspects of the
self (e.g. ‘materialism’, ‘egoism’, ‘hedonism’) are exter-
nalized and projected onto ‘Americans’, so that aggres-
sion is canalized. Second, on a cognitive level, social
phenomena associated with the denied traits (e.g.
‘capitalism’, ‘modernity’, ‘globalization’) are identified
with ‘America’. Anti-Americanism offers an interpret-
ation frame for complex social processes and functions
as a Manichean worldview that allows to reduce cognitive
dissonance. Both mechanisms—projection and the re-
duction of cognitive dissonance—presumably comple-
ment each other and are empirically expressed in the
correlation of anti-American attitudes and discontent
with capitalism, modernity, and globalization. The
according hypotheses prove to be relevant, as multivari-
ate regression analyses for the years 2002 and 2007 and
for the countries Britain, France, Germany, and Poland
show.1
After having elucidated the empirical data, the article
closes with a discussion of the findings in the light of
previous research, providing suggestions for further
study.
On the Concept of
Anti-Americanism
That our article intends to overcome a certain political
reductionism in the field of anti-Americanism research is
not to say that scholars are generally unaware of the
distinction between criticism of policies and actions
pursued by the United States and coherent negative anti-
American attitudes or resentment.2 In fact, many do
distinguish between both (Katzenstein and Keohane,
2007; Markovits, 2007a; Chiozza, 2009; Meunier, 2012).
The problem lies more in the application of the concept.
Most of the phenomena discussed and data used (be it
items in surveys, newspaper articles, or parliamentary
debates) are a mere expression of ‘opinion’ rather than
of ‘bias’ (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007: p. 22) and refer
to explicitly political phenomena. If the term ‘anti-
Americanism’ is used inappropriately, although it may
still be clearly defined, findings and conclusions are
distorted.
We therefore advocate using the term ‘anti-
Americanism’ solely for coherent negative attitudes
(Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). We understand anti-
American attitudes to be a psychological tendency to
devalue actors and phenomena perceived as ‘American’.
This concept is not very different from the one suggested
by Katzenstein and Keohane (2007: p. 12) in their
important volume,3 but it puts more emphasis on the
projective character of anti-Americanism: anti-American
attitudes are to a certain extent independent from actual
developments within American society: objects are even
perceived as ‘American’ irrespective of whether (like
the TV show Big Brother for example) they actually are
American. It follows that our concept of ‘anti-
Americanism’ is not restricted to political issues. It also
captures a negative evaluation of economic aspects and
cultural subjects such as language, sports, academia
(Markovits, 2007a), and even topics such as ‘obesity’
(Saguy, Kjerstin and Gong, 2010).
In general, although there might be an empirical
overlap of anti-Americanism and criticism of policies of
the United States, empirical studies have to aim for a
clear distinction between both phenomena. The main
criterion is that of coherence: an individual is to be
labelled ‘anti-American’ only if we find a coherent
attitude structure.4 This is not necessarily in opposition
to the finding of Chiozza (2009) that many individuals
hold ambivalent rather than outright negative attitudes.
This seems to be the case for the majority of people. In
our understanding, however, these individuals should
not be labelled ‘(manifest) anti-American’. This is not to
say that such individuals do not participate in an anti-
American discourse with certain utterances. But on a
conceptual level, one has to keep in mind the analytical
distinction between attitudes and discourse.
A Short History of European
Anti-Americanism
Historical studies on anti-Americanism have emphasized
that the origins of anti-Americanism can be found in
Western Europe’s late Romantic epoch—mainly in
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France and Germany (Ceaser, 2004), but also to some
extent in Britain (Gulddal, 2009).5 At the end of the 18th
century, ‘America’—the ‘new world’—had become very
much a utopia for many Europeans. Along with high
hopes, resentment also arose and the roots of this can be
found in an aristocratic or elitist anti-democratic
impulse against ‘mass society’, ‘superficiality’, and ‘ma-
terialism’. This applies both to the political right (e.g.
Nikolaus Lenau and Joseph de Maistre) and the left
(e.g. Heinrich Heine and Voltaire; see Diner, 1996, for
Germany, and Roger, 2005, for France). In France and
Germany, opponents and supporters of the French
Revolution in 1789 declared ‘America’ to be either a
frightening example of what Europe could become if the
Enlightenment took hold, or a society that would be too
democratic and in which the noblesse of the European
intelligentsia would get lost (Ceaser, 2004; Roger, 2005).
‘Degeneration’ presents the general narrative during that
time with regard to the new continent. Not only were
the natural surroundings, including animals and plants,
perceived as inferior compared with those of Europe, but
‘the Americans’ themselves and the political institutions
of the new nation were considered to be deformed, weak,
and fragile (Ceaser, 2004; Roger, 2005; Markovits,
2007a).
After World War I, anti-Americanism gained anti-
capitalist and anti-imperialist connotations. The tense
relation with anti-Semitism was also forged in that era. A
vivid illustration of this development represents the
image of President Wilson at that time (Diner, 1996).
Wilson—with his ‘American character’—symbolized
what Europeans feared most: the alienation and
modern abstractness that ‘the American way of life’
(and thinking) was supposed to bring to Europe. His
alleged ‘Jewishness’ (Wilson was actually Presbyterian)
supposedly proved that America was controlled by Jews.
During the 1920s, Germany in particular experienced a
huge push for modernization. The rapid political and
cultural changes, perceived as ‘Americanization’, led to a
growing ‘U¨berfremdungsangst’ (fear of foreign infiltra-
tion) and ‘Unbehagen in der Kultur’ (civilization and its
discontents; Lit: uneasiness in culture, see Freud, 1930/
1997).6 In this context, racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-
capitalist connotations were merged (Schwaabe, 2003).
A more radical form of this mainly economic anti-
Americanism could be found in Nazi Germany. After
years of tactical reserve and even appreciative interest in
the technical know-how of the United States (especially
in radio and cinema), the Nazis increasingly included
anti-American content in agitations (Diner, 1996;
Schwaabe, 2003). America was seen as an instrument
of Jewish capital employed to enslave the world. For that
matter, together with Britain, the United States became
the ‘hoard of modern capitalism’—the ideological arch-
enemy of National Socialism.
After World War II, a growing leftist form of anti-
Americanism could be observed. In Western Germany,
parts of the student movement exhibited anti-imperialist
and anti-American mindsets (Diner, 1996; Schwaabe,
2003). America was considered largely responsible for
warlike operations around the world—it was perceived
as the number one enemy of world peace. Under these
circumstances, an ironic shift took place: the United
States was declared a fascist state, and criticism of the
United States was part of an anti-fascist lesson from
history. Diner (1996) considers this to be a psychologic-
ally functional process in the relativization of German
guilt. But also in France, where parts of the communist
left viewed the United States as the imperialist nation,
‘America’ was identified with capitalism in general
(Roger, 2005). However, even when taking the politics
of the left into account, French anti-Americanism had a
more cultural drive.
In Britain, cases of anti-Americanism can be found
throughout history, and the same ‘snobbery’ as in France
or Germany was also articulated by British intellectuals
(e.g. Charles Dickens), especially between 1815 and 1835
(Roger, 2005: pp. 48–51; Gulddal, 2009). However,
compared with Germany and France, these were rather
sporadic episodes. Anti-Americanism, despite being
popular among the British left, did not become part of
a ‘cultural code’ (Diner, 1996: p. 20; Volkov, 1978) like
in large parts of continental Europe. The apparently
close relations between the former colony and its
colonist are based on a common Anglo-Saxon tradition
of thought, even more than on political dependencies
(Singh, 2007). Nevertheless, the Middle-East conflict has
its impact on opinions of ‘America’, as a significant part
of the British public is opposed to Israeli policies and
holds the United States to a certain extent responsible
for the development of the region (Mosbacher and
Anderson, 2004).
Compared with Germany and France, Poland has little
history of anti-Americanism because, disappointed with
the developments in Europe, America seemed for the
Poles a place of hope rather than of fear (Krzemin´ski,
2004; Behrends, 2005). Threatened by Russia and Prussia
since the 18th century, and later by the USSR and Nazi
Germany, the country developed a certain affinity with
the United States. In fact, Poland can be considered one
of the most pro-American countries in Europe (Antoszek
and Delaney, 2006). No official anti-Americanism had
developed before the influence of the Stalinist USSR
(Behrends, 2005). The translation of Ilya Ehrenburg’s
work V Amerike (In America), which was published in
Poland under the title Wro´ciiem z USA (Back From the
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USA) only a year after the Russian original came out in
1947, was expressly intended to spread hostility against
the United States in Poland. However, as mentioned
previously, anti-American propaganda was confronted
with a rather pro-American public.
This short historical excursion offers the basis for
examining whether specific national or cultural develop-
ments affect the current aversion against ‘America’,
which is often solely understood to be a response to the
special position of the United States in world politics.
Contrary to this perspective, prejudice and animosity
were already visible in times when the new continent had
virtually no influence on domestic relations in Europe.
In the following section, we show how the legacies of
anti-Americanism have impacted the resentment preva-
lent today (McAdam, 2007); collective memory preserves
negative attitudes and influences current perception.
Consequently, anti-Americanism can be assumed to be a
path-dependent phenomenon.
Recent Trends
The more recent development of anti-Americanism is
recorded, for example, in the Pew Global Attitudes
Project Surveys. They use a constant set of questions
about the ‘favourability of the United States’ and
‘favourability of Americans’ from 2002 to 2010 for
various countries (www.pewglobal.org).7 Most re-
searchers would agree that negative opinions towards
Americans on the one hand and the United States on the
other should be distinguished (Katzenstein and Keohane,
2007), and that the former can be considered a measure
of anti-Americanism (Chiozza, 2008), while the latter is
influenced by US foreign policies more strongly and thus
is considered a measure of ‘US-critique’.8 We are aware
that such an operationalization, especially of the concept
of anti-Americanism, is far from perfect, but unfortu-
nately, a more nuanced measurement instrument is only
available in the Pew data for the years 2002 and 2007.
We will introduce this instrument later in the section on
multivariate analyses.
Figure 1 shows descriptive results for the development
of negative views of the United States and Americans
between 2002 and 2010 in Britain, France, Germany, and
Poland (cross-sectional data). Three external events have
to be considered when interpreting the figures presented:
the 9/11 attacks of 2001, the Iraq war that started in
2003, and the election of Barack Obama as president in
2008. As much as the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon seemed to have closed
the ranks within the ‘Western world’, leading to broad
expressions of sympathy (but also to a lot of
Schadenfreude) and a conjoint war in Afghanistan, the
Iraq intervention starting in March 2003 evoked an
increasing alienation between parts of Europe and the
United States. Both in France and in Germany, the
political leadership began to use its criticism of the
United States to win elections (Markovits, 2007a;
Meunier, 2007), and even in Britain and Poland—US
allies in the Iraq war—there were mass demonstrations
against US policy. This almost consensual disaffirmation,
mainly of the Bush administration, led to a great deal of
enthusiasm for his ‘antagonist’, Barack Obama. Most
importantly for the commentators, his election seemed
to be a good sign that ‘America is coming to its senses’.
In all four countries, unfavourability of the United
States rose between 2003 and 2008. Britain shows values
between 16 per cent and 42 per cent, France between 25
per cent and 62 per cent, Germany between 33 per cent
and 66 per cent, and Poland between 11 per cent and 31
per cent. Differences between the countries are apparent.
In all years, Germany and France show a remarkably
higher percentage of critical opinions than Britain or
Poland. The latter has a peak of 31 per cent in 2007,
which does not even reach the lowest value of 33 per
cent observed in Germany in 2009. But there are also
similarities: In all four countries, negative opinions
began to rise with the start of the Iraq war in 2003
and it was not until 2009, when Barack Obama took
office, that values dropped again significantly (but not in
Poland). The maximum difference in aversion to the
United States over time varies between 20 per cent in
Poland and 37 per cent in France.
The values for negative views of Americans are
considerably lower than those for the United States.
Again, France (between 26 per cent and 43 per cent) and
Germany (between 23 per cent and 34 per cent) can be
clearly distinguished from Poland (between 12 per cent
and 26 per cent) and Britain (between 11 per cent and
22 per cent). On average, French and German inter-
viewees reported a higher degree of anti-Americanism
than their Polish and British counterparts. For all
countries, the lowest values can be found in 2002, a
year when solidarity with the victims of 9/11 still seemed
strong. The times of the respective turning points are
indeed the years 2003 (after the beginning of the Iraq
war) and 2009 (after Obama’s election), although, as
expected, the turning points are not that clear-cut
compared to those regarding negative views of the US.
Comparing the country-specific differences over the
years for both items, the fluctuation for negative
‘opinions of Americans’ is not as huge as for negative
‘opinions of the United States’: 11 per cent in Germany
and Britain (compared with 33 per cent and 26 per cent,
respectively), 14 per cent in Poland (compared with 20
per cent), and 17 per cent in France (compared with 37
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per cent). This can be interpreted as an indicator that
indeed, as Chiozza (2008) suggests, the ‘opinion about
Americans’, is less affected by external events such as
political tensions. Our findings are also in line with
others, showing that anti-Americanism did not vanish
with Obama’s election (Hatlapa and Markovits, 2010).
Concerning both the ‘opinion of the US’ and ‘opinion
of Americans’, the differences are especially noteworthy
for France and Germany. Not only is aversion to the
United States indeed more closely connected to US
policies than the aversion to Americans, but its ups and
downs are most striking in the two countries with the
highest absolute levels of negative opinions. This is an
interesting finding, but how can it be explained? It is
plausible that an ‘amplification effect’ is at work: the
high level of aversion to the United States in ‘better
times’ (here in 2002 when solidarity with the United
States seemed strong), which by assumption stems from
a deeper resentment, offers the basis for a stronger
aversion in ‘worse times’ (here between 2003 and 2008).
When a significant part of the population already feels
antagonistic towards the United States, it is more likely
Figure 1 Proportion of negative opinions of the United States and Americans.
Notes: The continuous line refers to ‘negative opinion of the United States’ and the dashed line to ‘negative opinion of
Americans’. As there are no data for Poland for the years 2003, 2004, and 2006, final conclusions have to be drawn with
caution. The number of cases varies for Britain between 458 in 2002 and 929 in 2007, for France between 488 in 2004 and
1002 in 2007, for Germany between 478 in 2003 and 967 in 2007, and for Poland between 443 in 2002 and 880 in 2005.
With the exception of Britain, the minimum number of cases can always be found for the item about ‘Americans’ and
maximum number for the item about ‘the United States’. This is due to the fact that in almost all cases, the item about
‘Americans’ produces slightly more missing values
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that other people will join the bandwagon. This, of
course, is a tentative explanation that has to be tested
elsewhere.
In summary, the findings show on a descriptive level
that external events have a considerably higher influence
on negative opinions of the United States than on
negative opinions of Americans. It is thus a shortcoming
of recent research that negative opinions of the United
States are frequently used as the operationalization of
anti-American attitudes. Even if the item ‘negative
opinions of Americans’ might entail an overestimation
as well, it can be used as a better (tentative) proxy for
anti-American resentment, especially in ‘good times’.
Having said this, we can conclude that the descriptive
trend figures at hand mirror the suggested historical path
dependencies resulting in higher levels of anti-
Americanism in France and Germany compared with
Britain and Poland. This can be taken as empirical
support of McAdams’ (2007) approach, which highlights
specific legacies of anti-Americanism.
What Drives Anti-Americanism?
While for several countries specific genealogies of anti-
Americanism, which account for the international
peculiarities, can be found, systematic reflections on
the theoretical mechanisms of the resentment in gen-
eral—and in sociological works in particular—are rare
(one exception is McAdams’ contribution; McAdams,
2007). As we have mentioned, many explanations in
recent works rest on a more or less subtle version of the
assumption that anti-Americanism is a reaction to the
peculiar position of the United States in world politics
(Cunliffe, 1986; Fabbrini, 2004; Nolan, 2005; Kohut and
Stokes, 2006; Friedman, 2008; Holsti, 2008). It is
presumed that the aversion to the United States stems
from its hegemonic character. Indeed, the most com-
prehensive feature of anti-Americanism among both the
left and the right, Europeans, and people in the Middle
East is to be found in the accusation of (political,
economic, and cultural) imperialism.
However, the global political conditions as such
cannot explain this anti-colonial connotation that, iron-
ically, was introduced by the 18th-century European
colonists. As we mentioned earlier, ‘America’ is not
merely detested for what it does but for what it is
supposed to be, namely, the hoard of modern, western,
and capitalist thinking (Markovits, 2007a). Hollander
(1992) has used the term ‘scapegoating impulse’ and
Diner (1996) the term ‘projection’ to indicate that
essentialistic resentment can only be explained if we
focus on the societies and individuals where this
resentment is prevalent. Keohane and Katzenstein
(2007: p. 6) make a similar point when they conclude
‘non-Americans look to the United States as a mirror
that reflects their own hopes, fears, and faults’. Chiozza’s
(2009) hypotheses (the information-and-contact, trad-
itional-worldview, anti-market, and scapegoat hypoth-
eses) also refer to deeper roots of anti-American
resentment.
All those works, however, lack an explication of the
theoretical mechanisms. The main aim of this section,
and of this article overall, is therefore to suggest a
tentative theoretical model of anti-Americanism. In
particular, we will introduce the concept of pathic
projection (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1947) and cognitive
dissonance (Festinger, 1957/1985).
The former was developed in Horkheimer and
Adornono’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947). There
‘pathic projection’ denotes a psychological process
constituting anti-Semitic resentment. The concept
builds on Freudian theory9 complemented by a broader
sociological framework and epistemological reflections.
According to Horkheimer, Adorno, and Lo¨wenthal (who
co-authored the respective section), anti-Semitism is
characterized by the suppression of certain libidinous
drives and ego-centred desires due to an over-identifi-
cation with normative imperatives of certain social
institutions. In a process of externalization, the denied
parts of the self are projected onto the Jews who
supposedly have everything the anti-Semite uncon-
sciously wishes for: ‘[. . .] happiness without power,
wages without work, a home without frontiers, religion
without myth’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1947: p. 165).
Formerly directed against the inner drives, the aggression
is now directed against an outer object. The Jews are
devalued and persecuted in place of the denied and
disliked parts of the self.
This approach is applicable to the phenomenon of
anti-Americanism. ‘America’ has been and continues to
be a subject of admiration for many people. At times,
this admiration is just as projective as undifferentiated
hate against everything perceived as ‘American’. No
other country is so inherently associated with the
concept of individual happiness and political freedom.
In the context of societies where individuals show a
tendency to feel threatened by those notions of freedom,
we might observe a devaluation of hedonistic traits and
aggressive outbursts against an outer entity associated
with the suppressed traits. This is apparent in the case of
radical Islamist anti-Americanism, where worldly lust is
strictly dismissed, but it also holds true for ‘post-
materialistic’ (Inglehart, 1977) and hyper-moral fractions
of Western societies. Here, the supposedly materialistic
and egoistic ‘Americans’ mirror the unconscious basis of
‘post-materialistic’ moral codes and are thus detested for
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reminding the ‘post-materialists’ of their denied egoistic
drives.
On an ideological level, the traits of ‘materialism’,
‘egoism’, and ‘hedonism’ refer to abstract concepts of
‘capitalism’ and ‘modernity’ in general, but also to the
more recent concept of ‘globalization’ in particular.
Here, a cognitive mechanism comes into play: the
complexity of these processes is rationalized in the
catchphrase ‘Americanization’. ‘America’ is imagined to
be the place where these processes originated. Being an
everyday life theory, anti-Americanism has the benefit of
‘explaining’ an increasingly ‘confusing world’ (Claussen,
2007). The cognitive benefit of such a rationalization of
abstract and confusing social processes lies in the
generation of consistency and the elimination of ‘cogni-
tive dissonance’ (Festinger, 1957/1985). A Manichean
worldview such as anti-Americanism offers a clear-cut
distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, draws a simple
picture of society, and consists of a fixed interpretative
frame, nearly untouched by changes in reality.
Based on those two theoretical approaches, we can
formulate the following two hypotheses: the hypothesis of
social discontent states that the stronger the negative
attitudes towards ‘capitalism’ and ‘modernity’ of an
individual, the stronger are his/her anti-American atti-
tudes. A derivative of this hypothesis is the hypothesis of
globalization critique, which states that the stronger the
negative attitudes towards ‘globalization’ of an individ-
ual, the stronger are his/her anti-American attitudes.
Both the mechanism of projection and the mechanism of
cognitive dissonance play a role in the underlying
psychological processes. Unconsciously desired but
superficially repelled traits are projected onto the
‘Americans’. Aggression that was originally directed
against parts of the self is now directed against an
outer enemy. On a more abstract level, the denied traits
are connected to disliked social processes (‘capitalism’,
‘modernity’, and ‘globalization’), which are again
identified with ‘America’ and thus externalized. The
psychic benefit of this externalization lies in the reduc-
tion of complexity and cognitive dissonance.
The approach of pathic projection further implies that
anti-American attitudes and anti-Semitic attitudes show
a positive correlation because both have a functional
similarity and both objects of projection (Jews and
Americans) are attributed with similar stereotypical
qualities (greedy, omnipotent, rational, etc.).10 The
hypothesis of anti-Semitism thus states: the stronger
the anti-Semitic attitudes of an individual, the stronger
are his/her anti-American attitudes.
In line with the approach of cognitive dissonance is
the contact hypothesis. Increasing contact with the reality
of the United States would make it necessary to correct
the homogenous picture of ‘America’ to reduce ‘cogni-
tive dissonance’. It can therefore be expected that anti-
American attitudes are less strong if individuals have
already visited the United States.11
In the following, we will present the respective
multivariate models, which are also based on Pew data,
to estimate the empirical validity of the proposed
theoretical mechanisms and corresponding hypothesis.
Multivariate Analyses
Studies on anti-Americanism containing multivariate
analyses are relatively new to the research field. Studies
by Ray and Johnston (2007), Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2004), Isernia (2007), and Chiozza (2009) are some of
the few contributions to use regression models, although
not all of these treat anti-Americanism as a dependent
variable. Chiozza’s study is currently probably the most
advanced (quantitative) empirical work in the field. We
treat his analyses as a solid basis and intend to
complement them with a more explicit and elaborated
theoretical framework (which suggests further explana-
tory variables) by choosing a more valid measurement of
anti-Americanism as a dependent variable and by
looking at two points in time. This approach will show
whether Chiozza’s (somewhat rash) judgement of anti-
Americanism as ‘too loose to be a well-knit ideology and
too differentiated to be a cultural syndrome’ (2009: p.
136) holds true when extending conceptual, theoretical,
and methodological research.
What follows is a presentation of multivariate analyses
for the years 2002 and 2007 and the countries Britain,
France, Germany, and Poland, based on the Pew data.
These points in time have been chosen for two reasons.
First, given the Pew data between 2002 and 2010, the
surveys carried out in 2002 and 2007 measure anti-
American resentment more comprehensively and also
best measure the theoretically derived determinants
discussed in the previous section. Second, the consider-
ation of two time points at least gives an impression of
whether effects are stable over time. This might be
especially interesting in the case at hand because, as
illustrated in the descriptive analyses, the opinion of the
United States and Americans in 2002 was favourable
compared with 2007.
Compared with the rather simple questions regarding
the favourability of the United States and Americans
presented in the section on recent trends, the measure-
ment instrument of anti-Americanism here consists of an
additive index for the multivariate analyses. This index
(ranging from 0¼ ‘no anti-Americanism at all’ to
3¼ ‘high degree of anti-Americanism’) is based on
three questions answered in the Pew polls for 2002 and
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2007 referring to a positive/negative evaluation of (i)
American ideas and customs, (ii) American ideas about
democracy, and (iii) American ways of doing business.
Thus, when added up, they comprise the cultural,
political, and economic dimensions of anti-American
attitude/resentment. Table 1 gives an overview of the
single items, the index, and all independent variables. It
has to be stressed that those data are not representative
for the countries in question.12 However, to date, there
are only few databases that comprise relevant variables
regarding anti-Americanism as well as useful measure-
ments of relevant determinants. The data at hand
provide at least a hint about which of the theoretical
assumptions can hold in empirical tests.
As can be seen in Table 1, a higher proportion of
respondents in France and Britain expressed negative
evaluations than in Britain and Poland. This is in line
with the historical sketch and descriptive results pre-
sented in the previous sections, and again supports the
idea of path dependencies with regard to anti-
Americanism. But the figures also show that the new
measurement instrument introduced in the present
section is still far from perfect. Between 2002 and
2007, we can observe a noteworthy increase for the item
on ‘American ideas and customs’, and an enormous
increase for ‘American ideas about democracy’. This is
not surprising because the evaluation of the latter is
probably connected to a more particular criticism of the
George W. Bush Administration in 2007. Nevertheless,
the distribution of the other two items shows, as
discussed in the sections on recent trends, that cultural
and economic items are less dependent on everyday
politics and, therefore, offer a more balanced measure-
ment of anti-Americanism. Here the major advantage of
a multi-item measurement is apparent: as our index is
consistent and reliable according to satisfactory principal
component and reliability analyses,13 we control for an
overestimation of one of the items. The multidimen-
sionality of the index guarantees that we actually
measure ‘coherent attitudes’, as a high score on this
index implicates a tendency to devalue ‘Americanness’
irrespective of the subject of discussion (economic,
political, or cultural). Quite contrary to Chiozza’s
(2009: p. 136) suggestion that there is no clear negative
attitude that could be labelled ‘anti-Americanism’, we
found a high proportion of respondents who show
negative evaluations of all three aspects: 29.6 per cent
and 41.2 per cent in the case of Britain, 40.7 per cent
and 56.0 per cent in the case of France, 33.8 per cent and
52.0 per cent in the case of Germany, and 26.5 per cent
and 36.9 per cent in the case of Poland for the years
2002 and 2007, respectively. These values indicate the
enormous potential of anti-Americanism in Europe.T
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The independent variables are measured as follows:
social discontent with ‘capitalism’ and ‘modernity’ is
measured by means of two items: (i) for 2002, with an
item concerning a positive opinion towards the institu-
tion of a free market economy that characterizes all four
countries. Except for Poland, this item is not available in
the 2007 data set. (ii) The other item focuses on the
perceived loss of the traditional way of life. Although the
common problem of distinguishing evaluative and
descriptive dimensions of the item seems apparent
here, we think it can be used as a proxy for discontent
with modernization. In all four countries, a large
majority of the respondents are convinced that the
traditional way of life is in decline.
The measurement of globalization critique is also based
on two items: first, on the trade and business networks
between the respondent’s home country and other
countries, and second, on the influence of large foreign
companies in the respondent’s home country. As it turns
out, in each of the four countries, respondents are more
concerned about the influence of large foreign compa-
nies than growing business networks.
There is no item measuring genuine anti-Semitism in
the Pew data. However, recent research on anti-Semitism
has suggested that anti-Zionism can be considered a
derivative of anti-Semitic thinking (Chesler, 2005; Hirsh,
2007). Keeping the data at hand in mind, we define anti-
Zionism in this article as the denial of Israel’s right to
exist. There are, however, more ‘elaborated’ forms of
anti-Zionism that do not necessarily deny Israel the right
to exist but that use anti-Semitic stereotypes or have to
be traced via their function in certain discourses. The
item consists of the following wording: ‘Which statement
comes closest to your opinion? A way can be found for
the state of Israel to exist so that the rights and needs of
the Palestinian people are taken care of OR, the rights
and needs of the Palestinian people cannot be taken care
of as long as the state of Israel exists?’ The proportion of
respondents who can be classified as anti-Zionist varies
between 12 per cent in Germany and 26 per cent in
Poland.
There is also a remarkable variation between countries
with regard to respondents who have already visited the
United States at least once. The highest proportions can
be observed for Britain and the lowest for Poland. The
list of independent variables considered in the multi-
variate analysis also includes respondents’ political
attitudes, gender, age in years, whether respondents
have secondary school education, and whether they
belong to a high-income class (based on a median split
of the original income variable).
The results of ordinary least square regression models
are documented in Table 2.14 For each country, two
models were estimated, one for the year 2002 and one
for the year 2007. The first main hypothesis, the
hypothesis of social discontent, is to some extent sup-
ported in all countries for the two points in time, with
the exception of Britain in 2007. The stronger the
respondents’ negative opinion about the institution of a
market economy, the higher their values on the anti-
Americanism index in 2002. The coefficients are signifi-
cant for Germany and Poland, while the coefficient for
Britain just reaches the 10 per cent significance level, and
for France, the effect is clearly non-significant. Moreover,
respondents who perceive a loss of traditional ways of
life also have significantly higher anti-Americanism
values in France and Germany in both years and in
Britain in 2002. While showing the expected positive
sign, the coefficients for Britain in 2007 and for Poland
in 2002 and 2007 are not statistically significant.
With regard to the hypothesis of globalization critique,
more robust correlations with anti-Americanism can be
observed for the item ‘negative evaluations of the
influence of large foreign companies in respondent’s
home country’ compared with the item ‘negative evalu-
ation of growing business ties’. While the former shows
positive and significant effects in all models, except for
Germany in 2007, the latter has the expected positive
sign, but it is only significant for Britain, France, and
Germany in 2002.
There is a positive association between anti-Zionism
and anti-Americanism in all four countries. For
Germany and Poland, this positive correlation is also
statistically significant. This supports the argument of
several researchers who highlight the relationship be-
tween anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism (Diner, 1996;
Haury, 2005; Markovits, 2007b; Knappertsbusch and
Kelle, 2010). Here again, path dependencies might come
into play. Poland with its strong history of anti-Semitism
(Gross, 2007) but a relatively low degree of anti-
Americanism is a case where anti-American attitudes
are quite a new phenomenon. As the United States and
Israel are considered close allies, it seems plausible that
recent Polish anti-Americanism is triggered by negative
attitudes towards Jews in general and Israel in particular.
In Germany, where anti-Americanism has a long trad-
ition that is based on the aforementioned anti-colonial
complex and where genuine expressions of anti-Semitism
in public are perceived to be a taboo, anti-Zionism
together with anti-Americanism might be a way to
communicate anti-Semitic attitudes indirectly
(Bergmann and Heitmeyer, 2005).
The contact hypothesis is based on the assumption that
anti-Americans have visited the United States less often
than others because visits would increase cognitive
dissonance. Here, causality can go in both directions.
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On the one hand, not having visited the United States
will increase prejudice and on the other hand, individ-
uals who have prejudices will avoid visiting the country.
In all models, the hypothesis holds true with regard to
the negative sign of the estimated coefficients; the effects
are statistically significant for Britain in both years and
for France as well as Germany in 2007.
The prevalence of anti-Americanism in certain polit-
ical milieus has been another point of discussion in the
literature. In this regard, we included respondents’
political attitudes in the multivariate models. It seems
there is an overall trend towards lower values on the
anti-Americanism index for respondents with a rather
right-wing attitude; yet, the effect is statistically signifi-
cant in just one case (France in 2007). We also tested for
a U-shaped correlation between political attitudes and
anti-Americanism, that is, higher values of anti-
Americanism from respondents with a strong left-wing
or right-wing attitude. However, additional analyses do
not support such a non-linear effect of the political
attitude in six of eight models in Table 2. The two
exceptions show that in Britain, the proposed U-shaped
relation can be found in 2002, and in Poland, an
unexpected inverted U-shaped relation can be found in
2007 (i.e. higher values more or less in the centre of the
political spectrum). Hence, our data support Markovits
and Rensmann’s (2007) estimation that nowadays anti-
Americanism has become an overlapping phenomenon
that has lost its exclusivity in regard to the political
‘extremes’ in the past 10 years.
Among the sociodemographic variables, age is the only
one to show a clear pattern. In all models, anti-
Americanism significantly increases with respondents’
age, with the exception of France and Germany in 2007.
Gender, education, and income do not show noteworthy
effects across the four countries. The findings indicate,
however, a positive and significant effect of education for
Germany: higher educated respondents were found to
express higher values of anti-Americanism. This is in line
with qualitative research that has highlighted that anti-
Americanism is most common among members of
Germany’s intellectual elite (Markovits, 2007a).
Overall, the presented multivariate results provide
rather strong support for the hypotheses of social
discontent and globalization critique across the four
countries and the two points in time. This can be
considered an indication that both the mechanism of
projection and the mechanism of cognitive dissonance
offer explanations that are valid over time. Further, the
contact hypothesis has a high plausibility, that is,
correlations are negative as predicted and significant
for at least one point in time for Britain, France, and
Germany. A striking difference between the four
countries can be found with regard to the association
between anti-Semitism/anti-Zionism and anti-
Americanism. There are positive and significant effects
in Germany and Poland, whereas the effects are clearly
below the significance threshold in both Britain and
France.
The explained variance of the models ranges between
6 per cent and 22 per cent. Such values are common in
social science research, but they clearly point to
additional explanatory factors. Another reason for the
lack of explained variance may be that the measurement
instruments considered in the Pew data do not fully
match the theoretical concepts, neither ‘anti-
Americanism’ nor ‘social discontent’ and ‘globalization
critique’.
Discussion and Conclusions
The findings of this article shed new light on the
assumptions made in anti-Americanism research to date.
First of all, we have demonstrated that negative views
today are dependent on the specific historical traditions
of the resentment: if a country has a strong history of
anti-Americanism (such as Germany or France), higher
levels of negative attitudes can be reported compared
with countries that do not have such a history (especially
Poland). Against this background, it seems highly
problematic to consider anti-Americanism simply as a
function of recent political conflicts (Cunliffe, 1986;
Fabbrini, 2004; Nolan, 2005; Kohut and Stokes, 2006;
Friedman, 2008; Holsti, 2008).
Furthermore, we have challenged the statement that
anti-Americanism cannot be considered a consistent
attitude (e.g. Chiozza, 2009). Although it might be true
that many individuals have rather conflicting views on
Americans and the United States, we found that a
considerable proportion shows negative evaluation scores
regarding all three social dimensions (i.e. economic,
political, or cultural). According to the relevant statistical
values (principal component loadings and Cronbach’s
alpha), the respective anti-Americanism index (Table 1)
is consistent and reliable.
We also saw that evaluations of economic and cultural
phenomena are less dependent on short-term political
developments. Thus the finding in previous studies
(Meunier, 2012) that the ups and downs of anti-
Americanism point to the impact of decisions made by
the US administration has to be put into perspective. If
we use a multidimensional instrument, significant shares
of external effects are controlled for.
However, one might argue that the three-item instru-
ment we used here is still insufficient as a measure of
consistent anti-American attitudes. We recognize this
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objection, but we believe that this three-item index is by
far the best measure that can be found in the literature
so far.
A further objection could refer to our finding that anti-
American attitudes are path-dependent: it might be possible
that we have ignored a hidden factor Z, which had an
influence on attitudes earlier in history and still has an
influence today. Maybe it is, for example, the geopolitical
position of France and Germany as European superpowers
that make them responsive for anti-Americanism, while
Poland was and is in need of strong allies, and Britain
traditionally finds itself in a transatlantic squeeze. Although
at this point we are not able to test this rival hypothesis,
we might be able to do so in a couple of years when the
Polish integration into the European Union has
advanced and Poland will have lost its precarious ‘middle
position’.
In regard to the theoretical mechanisms, it has to be
stressed that the ones we suggested here offer only two
ways of coping with the lack of theory in previous
research. Approaches looking at the impact of morality,
social norms, or the attitude/behaviour relationship
(Ajzen, 1988) could be fruitful too. It is also difficult
to measure the mechanisms of projection and cognitive
dissonance directly. Although this holds true for many
theoretical concepts in the social sciences, a study with
primary data would be able to operationalize the
concepts more precisely. Such a study could also apply
a multi-item measure that offers more valid data on the
proportion of anti-Americans in the respective countries.
Nevertheless, this study advances our understanding of
anti-Americanism significantly: considerable proportions
of Europeans seem to have negative opinions about US
‘customs’, ‘ideas about democracy’, and ‘ways of doing
business’. This aversion against America is mainly based
on the broader social discontent with the market
economy, the loss of tradition, and globalization.
In turbulent times, people seem to be in need of
someone they can blame for the domestic problems they
face. From the 18th century until today, America has
been there to fulfil this role.
Notes
1. We chose France and Germany as examples because
they are considered the ‘birthplaces’ of anti-
Americanism (Ceaser, 2004). Britain, on the other
hand, is seen as a cultural and political confederate
of the United States. With Poland we include an
Eastern European country to present a more
heterogeneous picture. Apart from that, Poland is
an interesting example due to its geopolitical
location that made it one of the most contested
nation states in Europe and led to a probably
unique sympathy for the United States (in contin-
ental Europe), which was proven once more during
the 2003 Iraq war when, unlike Germany and
France, Poland, although parts of its public were
engaged in protests against the war, actively sup-
ported the US troops (Gordon and Shapiro, 2004).
2. Note that we are using the concepts of coherent
attitudes and resentment synonymously in this
article. The latter is not identical with the more
demanding concept of ‘Ressentiment’ introduced by
Nietzsche (1878/2000) and extended by Scheler
(1912/2004).
3. Katzenstein and Keohane’s (2007) typology of ‘Anti-
Americanisms’ is helpful in specifying the context in
which certain aspects are more or less relevant.
However, we prefer the singular in this article,
because we want to highlight the common features
of the resentment, treat milieu (education, income,
political attitudes) as determinants, and measure the
intensity of anti-Americanism with a cardinal and
no nominal scale.
4. The term ‘coherence’ refers to the individual
evaluation. It does not imply that every anti-
American individual uses the same stereotypes or
that anti-Americanism takes the same shape in every
country, for example.
5. Compared with works with a sociological approach,
those dealing with the historical origin of anti-
Americanism are large in number and this article
does not intend to add something new to this
historical literature. We selected a small sample to
illustrate the point that today’s aversion against
‘America’ is a path-dependent phenomenon. Note
also that this section does not offer a complete or
representative picture of attitudes towards ‘America’
during the time under discussion. Anti-Americanism
was rather the exception, not the rule, especially
among ‘regular people’. However, we think it is not
imperative to discuss the Europeans’ complete image
of America in the 19th and 20th century to point out
the elements of anti-Americanism.
6. It seems no coincidence that Freud picked up on the
matter during the late 1920s. He was one of the first
to identify the dialectics in modernity recognizable
during that time in Europe and especially in the
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‘verspa¨tete Nation’ (belated nation) of Germany
(Plessner, 1959/1998).
7. The exact wording of the two items we refer to in
the present section is: ‘Please tell me if you have a
very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat
unfavourable or very unfavourable opinion of the
United States’; ‘[. . .] of Americans’. We use a binary
coded variable that distinguishes between ‘favour-
able’ and ‘unfavourable’.
8. Nevertheless many authors and the Pew reports also
use the ‘opinions of the US’ as an indicator of anti-
Americanism (Pew, 2003, 2009). As we mentioned
earlier, the continuing divide between substantial
reflections on a conceptual level and the flawed
application of those concepts in empirical studies is
surprising.
9. In the Schreber case study, Freud describes the basic
mechanism of ‘projection’ as a process where ‘an
internal perception is suppressed, and, instead, its
content, after undergoing a certain kind of distor-
tion, enters consciousness in the form of an external
perception’ (Freud, 1911/2003: p. 56).
10. There are some studies that have elaborated on
the similarities and differences between anti-
Americanism and anti-Semitism (Diner, 1996;
Haury, 2005; Markovits, 2007b; Knappertsbusch
and Kelle, 2010).
11. As Hollander’s (2004) volume documents, there
seems to be a domestic version of anti-
Americanism that follows the same projective and
cognitive function as, for example, its European
counterpart. In this regard, of course, the contact
hypothesis makes no sense and one has to
suggest a much higher degree of denial and
preference for consistency among domestic anti-
Americans.
12. There are two main reasons for this. First, not all
relevant questions were presented to all respondents
in each country; for example, in 2007, only half of
the sample answered the questions regarding anti-
Americanism. Second, missing values (e.g. regarding
income) reduce the number of cases.
13. In all cases, there is just one factor (principal
component method) with an eigenvalue above 1,
and explained variances ranging from 0.50 (France)
to 0.70 (Poland). Reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s
alpha) vary depending on the year and country
between 0.49 (France) and 0.76 (Poland).
14. As the dependent variable consists of four values, an
ordered logit model may have been the preferred
choice. Indeed, we estimated the corresponding
ordered logit models for all models presented in
Table 2, and there are no apparent differences
regarding the t- and z-values and hence the signifi-
cance of coefficients. Hence, we opted for the ordinary
least square model, which is more common and easier
to interpret. Moreover, we use weighted data in the
multivariate analyses. We also estimated the models
with non-weighted data due to the fact that it is by no
means clear whether weighted data should generally
be the preferred option (Winship and Radbill, 1994).
Here, too, the results are stable. Moreover, as can be
seen in the (see Table A1), the main results do not
seem to be affected by the reduction of data due to
missing values on relevant variables. The pattern of
significant bivariate correlations between the index of
anti-Americanism and the independent variables
included in the regression fits the pattern of statistic-
ally significant determinants in the multivariate ana-
lysis presented in Table 2.
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Appendix
Table A1 Bivariate correlations between anti-Americanism and proposed determinants
Britain France Germany Poland
country/year 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007
Social discontent
Market economy better for
most (1–4¼ disagree)
0.16** — — 0.17* — 0.20* 0.23*
344 811 296 320
Tradition gets lost (1¼ yes) 0.26* 0.13** 0.14** 0.11** 0.16*
349 457 494 812 422
Globalization critique
Growing business ties
(1–4¼ very bad)
0.16** 0.16** 0.21* 0.13* 0.14* 0.23* 0.18** 0.15***
358 305 458 493 815 423 307 316
Influence of large companies
(1–4¼ very bad)
0.24* 0.22* 0.20* 0.26* 0.21* 0.16* 0.19** 0.20*
356 304 451 488 803 410 289 321
Anti-Zionism
Palestinians cannot coexist
with Israel (1¼ yes)
— — — 0.15** — 0.25*
402 223
Visits to the United States
Ever traveled to the United
States (1¼ yes)
-0.11*** -0.16*** -0.09*** -0.16* -0.21*
361 318 460 494 402
Political attitude
Higher values indicate a
right-wing attitude
-0.09*** -0.16*
437 490
Sociodemographics
Gender (1¼ female) 0.13***
427
Age in years 0.26* 0.16* 0.10** 0.22* 0.20*
361 314 821 315 331
Higher education
(1¼ yes)
High income class
(1¼ yes)
-0.08*** -0.19*
729 427
Source: Reported are pairwise and statistically significant Pearson correlations between the anti-Americanism index and proposed determinants (first number
gives the coefficient) as well as the number of respondents (second number); *P < 0.001, **P< 0.01, ***P < 0.05.
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